INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR 8867
REVIEWED BY PSchmalz DATE 7/2/85
RDS-1 03/16/87 (HITCHCOCK, DAVID) OR-O
ARCHIVAL RETENTION
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
RELEASED IN PART
EXEMPTIONS



INFO OCT-01 ADS-00 INR-10 EUR-12 SS-15 CIAE-00 EB-08
H-01 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 CONE-00 TSCE-00 TEL-03 CSCE-04
TRSE-00 PM-03 PA-01 OMB-01 INRE-00 ACDA-12 SP-02
NCE-00 SPRS-02 /092 W

R 161516Z MAR 87 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5773
INFO SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
USICA WASHDC
AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE
USLO RIYADH IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY CAIRO
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TEL AVIV 04171

STATE FOR NEA, PM, PA, T, AND S/P

DEFENSE FOR ISA
USICA FOR NEA

E.O. 12065: GDS 3/16/87 (HITCHCOCK, DAVID) OR-O
TAGS: MASS, SOPN, SA, US, IS
SUBJ: REQUEST FOR RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ON SALE OF F-15 ADD-ONS AND AERIAL SURVEILLANCE AIRCRAFT TO SAUDI ARABIA

REF: STATE 057759, STATE 057321, USICA 10598

1. VERY MUCH APPRECIATE RECEIVING VELIOTES/BURT PRESS BACKGROUNDER ON U.S. MILITARY SALES TO SAUDI ARABIA AND TEXT OF 1978 BROWN-SPARKMAN LETTER.

2. CONCERNS OF ISRAELI OFFICIALS, KNESSET MEMBERS AND MEDIA MAKE IT CLEAR THAT ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS ON F-15 ACCESSORIES AND OTHER POSSIBLE MILITARY SALES TO SAUDI ARABIA WILL BE ASKED HERE.

3. THERE FOLLOWS A LIST OF QUESTIONS WHICH RESPONSIBLE THOUGH NOT NECESSARILY WELL-INFORMED ISRAELIS ARE LIKELY TO ASK IN THE NEXT FEW DAYS:

A. WHY DOES SAUDI ARABIA NEED F-15 CONFORMAL FUEL TANKS WHICH GIVE IT ADDITIONAL RANGE, IF THE PLANES ARE ONLY TO BE USED FOR INTERNAL SELF-DEFENSE?

B. IS IT TRUE THAT THE F-15 DOES NOT HAVE A RADAR SYSTEM FOR AIR-TO-GROUND BOMBING? IF SO, WHY WOULD THE U.S. CONSIDER SELLING SAUDI ARABIA BOMB RACKS?

C. DOES THE U.S. INTEND TO SELL SAUDI ARABIA VARIOUS CRYPTOLOGICAL AND ELECTRONIC COUNTERMEASURES CAPABILITIES OF THE U.S. AIR FORCE VERSION OF THE F-15?

D. WHAT KIND OF ASSURANCES HAS THE U.S. RECEIVED FROM SAUDI ARABIA RECENTLY THAT IT HAS NO INTENTION OF USING THE F-15 AIRCRAFT FOR ANY PURPOSE OTHER THAN LEGITIMATE SELF-DEFENSE; THAT IT WILL NOT EMPLOY THE AIRCRAFT OFFENSIVELY SPECIFICALLY AGAINST ISRAEL; AND THAT IT WILL NOT TRANSFER THE F-15 TO THIRD COUNTRIES, OR PERMIT THIRD COUNTRY NATIONALS TO TRAIN ON THE F-15 AIRCRAFT?

E. HAS THE U.S. RECEIVED NEW ASSURANCES FROM THE SAUDIS THAT THEY DO NOT INTEND TO BASE THEIR F-15'S AT TABUK IN THE NORTH OF THE COUNTRY? DOES THE U.S. ALSO HAVE NEW ASSURANCES THAT TABUK WILL NOT BE EQUIPPED TO SERVE AS AN OPERATING BASE FOR F-15'S? NOW ABOUT FOR AWACS OR HAWK-EYES?

F. COULD YOU GIVE US MORE PRECISE ESTIMATES ON DELIVERY TO SAUDI ARABIA OF 1) F-15'S, 2) CONFORMAL FUEL TANKS, 3) AWACS (OR OTHER AERIAL SURVEILLANCE CRAFT), 4) AIR-TO-AIR MISSLES? WHEN DO YOU ESTIMATE A DECISION WILL BE MADE ON BOMB RACKS?

G. FOR HOW LONG A PERIOD WOULD YOU ESTIMATE THAT U.S. TECHNICIANS WOULD HAVE TO BE IN SAUDI ARABIA TO TRAIN, INSTALL, ASSIST THAT COUNTRY'S AIR FORCE WITH THE F-15'S AND ADDITIONAL RELATED EQUIPMENT? AT WHAT POINT WOULD YOU ESTIMATE THE SAUDIS TO BE FULLY CAPABLE OF HANDLING ALL THIS EQUIPMENT ON THEIR OWN?

H. IF THE F-15'S ARE "INTERCEPTOR AIRCRAFT," AS WAS STATED BY U.S. OFFICIALS, THEN WHY WOULD THE U.S. CONSIDER EQUIPPING THEM, IN SAUDI ARABIA, WITH AIR-TO-GROUND ORDNANCE?
CONFIDENTAIL

I. WOULD NOT AWACS AIRCRAFT OPERATED BY SAUDI AIR FORCE "TOTALLY EXPOSE" ISRAEL "TO FORCES HOSTILE TO THE STATE OF ISRAEL" (AS PUBLICLY STATED BY DEPUTY DEFENSE MINISTER ZIPORI)?

J. DOES THE INFORMATION NOW BEING OBTAINED FOR SAUDI ARABIA FROM THE FOUR U.S. AWACS NOW IN SAUDI ARABIA INCLUDE DATA ON ISRAEL?

K. WOULD THE U.S. BE WILLING TO SELL AWACS TO ISRAEL, IF

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ACTION NEA-11

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| INFO | OCT-01 | ADS-00 | INR-10 | EUR-12 | SS-15 | CIAE-00 | EB-08 |
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| | MCE-00 | SPRS-02 | /092 W | | | | |

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FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 TEL AVIV 04171

STATE FOR NEA, PM, PA, T, AND S/P

DEFENSE FOR ISA
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THE U.S. DECIDED TO SELL THEM TO SAUDI ARABIA AND ISRAEL SO REQUESTED?

L. IS IT NOT TRUE THAT THE SAUDIS WILL BE ABLE TO COVER ALL OF ISRAEL WITH A SINGLE AWAC, FLYING ONLY OVER SAUDI ARABIA? FOLLOWUP: WHERE WOULD SUCH AN AIRCRAFT HAVE TO BE POSITIONED TO MONITOR ALL OF ISRAEL?

M. DOES NOT THE SUPPLY OF ADVANCED MILITARY EQUIPMENT TO SAUDI ARABIA INVITE GREATER PRESSURE ON THAT COUNTRY TO JOIN OTHER ARAB STATES IN MILITARY ACTION AGAINST ISRAEL? SAUDI ARABIA WILL NO LONGER HAVE THE EXCUSE IT USED BEFORE, THAT IT WAS NOT STRONG ENOUGH TO RISK JOINING THE WAR AGAINST ISRAEL IN EARNEST.

N. DO YOU THINK THERE MIGHT BE MERIT IN THE IDEA PROPOSED IN THE ISRAELI PRESS OF A DEMILITARIZED GULF OF EILAT (AQABA)? A DEMILITARIZED SINAI, FROM APRIL 1982, MEANS IN EFFECT THAT THE WESTERN SHORE OF THE GULF WILL BE ALREADY DEMILITARIZED. HOW ABOUT THE EASTERN SHORE AND THE GULF ITSELF?

4. ACTION REQUESTED: WOULD APPRECIATE "IF ASKED" REPLIES TO ABOVE QUESTIONS. PLEASE INDICATE IF REPLIES CAN BE ON THE RECORD, ON BACKGROUND OR ON DEEP BACKGROUND.
LEWIS